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FOREWORD 
The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate’s Risk 
and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis 
expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and 
Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis.  The fundamental goal of 
this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decision-
makers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating 
personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating 
systems as well as with any future systems. 
The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable 
backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields.  This group includes JSC 
S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR.  The Analysis Group’s 
experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, 
Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace 
experience—specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation 
Programs.  The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA 
centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information 
to the group when performing various analysis tasks.  The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is 
recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community.  
Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) 
continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the 
Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. 
The Analysis Section’s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification 
processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major 
probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program 
requirements.  During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments.  
Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decision-
making processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs.  Two of the more significant 
tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP 
and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP.  These two activities, along with 
the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this 
report.  This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide 
crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) 
PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs 
for the CxP’s Lunar Sortie and ISS missions. 
Roger L. Boyer 
JSC S&MA Analysis Branch Chief 
2101 NASA Parkway, Mail Code NC 
Houston, Texas 77058 
roger.l.boyer@nasa.gov 
281.483.6070 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Risk and Reliability Analysis Group was formed in 2003, under a general 
reorganization that formed the S&MA Directorate from the former Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Directorate at JSC.  The Analysis Group is part of the 
Analysis Branch in the Shuttle and Exploration Division.  The figure below shows the 
Analysis Group’s organizational structure within JSC. 
 
The NASA Procedural Requirements, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Requirements (NPR 7120.5D), March 06, 2007, establishes the requirement for risk 
management and analysis, more specifically PRA, to be used in all NASA projects and 
programs.  The NASA Policy Directive, NASA Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) 
Program Policy (NPD 8720.1B), April 29, 2004, establishes a similar requirement for R&M 
analyses.  The Analysis Group assists NASA programs and projects in meeting these 
obligations to ensure decisions concerning risks are informed, vehicles are safe and 
reliable, and program/project requirements are realistic and realized. 
Probabilistic risk assessment, reliability and maintainability analysis, and data collection 
enable the Analysis Group to provide crucial reliability and failure information that NASA 
uses to support many of its safety-related decisions. 
Shuttle and Exploration Division 
Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate 
NASA, Johnson Space Center 
NC4/Analysis Branch
Chief:  Roger Boyer  
 
Risk & Reliability Analysis Group 
 Bob Cross – Group Lead and Constellation PRA 
 Mark Bigler – Cx PRA 
 Teri Hamlin – Shuttle PRA 
 Richard Heydorn – Cx R&M 
 Bruce Reistle – Data Lead 
 Henk Roelant – CEV & S/W 
 Michael Stewart – CEV PRA 
 Mark Valentine – Shuttle R&M 
 Scott Winter – Lunar Lander 
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PRA 
PRA is a comprehensive, structured, and disciplined approach for identifying, analyzing, 
and quantifying risks in engineered systems.  PRA is primarily used as a decision support 
tool that uncovers design and operational weakness in engineered systems and then helps 
to systematically identify and prioritize safety improvements.  PRAs must adequately 
represent the system design and operation as well as use standard and consistent PRA 
methods, practices, and applications.  The complexity of a PRA is dependent on the 
complexity of the system being assessed and the questions to be answered.  Complex 
system assessments require a team of PRA analysts and domain experts working together.  
The purpose and scope of a PRA drives the selection of PRA methods used for the 
analysis.  The SSP uses PRA to assess mission risks as an input to its risk-informed 
decision-making process.  The CxP and its project offices are using PRA during the 
conceptual phase and will continue using PRA throughout the life of the program to 
evaluate mission, system, element, and subsystem level risks both within and across 
projects.  PRA is also used to perform focused risk studies.  The knowledge gained about 
the risks to a system may then be used by management to cost-effectively improve the 
system’s safety and performance in the face of uncertainties by making risk-informed 
decisions.  If a PRA is performed early in the design and development cycle and the 
engineering and operations communities are actively engaged in performing the PRA, the 
PRA becomes an effective design tool for verifying risk requirements, performing risk 
trade studies, and reducing uncertainties. 
In general, PRA is a process that seeks answers to three basic questions: 
 
 
What kinds of events or scenarios 
can occur (i.e., what can go wrong)? 
 
What are the likelihoods and 
associated uncertainties of the 
events or scenarios?
 What consequences could result 
from these events or scenarios  
(e.g., loss of crew or loss of 
mission)?
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The figure below provides an overview of the PRA process. 
 
The following paragraphs summarize PRA services the Analysis Group provides as well as 
some of the PRA tools they use. 
Scenario Modeling uses inductive logic and probabilistic tools such as Event Sequence 
Diagrams (ESDs) and event trees to model each scenario.  ESDs help the analysts and the 
review team identify the failure logic associated with the system or scenarios being 
developed.  Event trees are developed from the ESDs to quantify the failure scenarios. 
Failure Modeling uses deductive logic and probabilistic tools called fault trees to model each 
failure (or its complement, success) for a pivotal event in a failure scenario.  Fault trees 
consist of three parts.  The topmost element (top event) is a given pivotal event defined in 
a failure scenario.  The second part of the fault tree consists of intermediate events that 
cause the top event.  These events are linked through logic gates (i.e., AND gates and OR 
gates) to the basic events.  The basic events are the third part of the fault tree, and their 
occurrence ultimately causes the top event. 
Fault Tree (FT) System ModelingEvent Tree (ET) Modeling 
IE B C D E End 
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5: LOC 
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A 
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one or more
of these
elementary
events
One of these events
AND
Event Sequence Diagram  (Inductive Logic)
IE
End State: OK
End State: LOM
End State: ES2 
End State: LOC
A B 
C D E 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 10 20 
30 40 50 60 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 5 10 
15 20 25 30 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 10 20 
30 40 50 
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The uncertainty in occurrence frequency of an event 
is characterized by a probability distribution 
Examples (from left to right): 
Probability that the hardware x fails when needed 
Probability that the crew fail to perform a task 
Probability that there would be a windy condition at the time of landing 
Communicating & Documenting
Risk Results and Insights to Decision-maker
 Displaying the results in tabular and graphical forms
 Ranking of risk scenarios
 Ranking of individual events (e.g., hardware failure,
human errors, etc.)
 Insights into how various systems interact
 Tabulation of all the assumptions
 Identification of key parameters that greatly influence
the results
 Presenting results of sensitivity studies
 Proposing candidate mitigation strategies
Technical Review of Results and Interpretation 
Model Integration and Quantification of Risk Scenarios
Integration and quantification of
logic structures (ETs and FTs)
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uncertainties to obtain
 minimal cutsets (risk
scenarios in terms of basic
events)
 likelihood of risk scenarios
 uncertainty in thelikelihood estimates0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 20
40
60
80
100
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End State: LOC Domain Experts ensure that system failure logic 
is correctly captured in model and appropriate data 
is used in data analysis
Model Logic and Data Analysis Review
 4 2008 Annual Report 
Quantification and Integration is a process that uses an integrated PRA computer program to 
logically link and quantify the fault trees appearing in the path of each scenario.  The 
frequency of occurrence for each end state in the event tree is the product of the initiating 
event’s frequency and the (conditional) probabilities of the pivotal events along the 
scenario path linking the initiating event to the end state.  The scenarios are then grouped 
according to the end state of the scenario defining the consequence.  Finally, all end states 
are then grouped (i.e., their frequencies are summed into the frequency of a representative 
end state). 
Uncertainty Analysis is part of the quantification process that evaluates the degree of 
knowledge or confidence in the calculated numerical risk results.  Monte Carlo simulation 
methods are generally used to perform uncertainty analysis; although, other methods exist. 
Sensitivity Analysis is frequently performed in a PRA to indicate analysis inputs or elements 
whose value changes cause the greatest changes in partial or final risk results.  Sensitivity 
analysis identifies system components that, if modified, will have a greater impact on the 
overall system risk. 
Importance Ranking is a special technique used in some PRA applications to identify the 
lead, or dominant, contributors to risk in accident sequences or scenarios by listing the 
lead contributors in decreasing order of importance.  This process is generally performed 
first at the fault tree level and then at the event tree levels.  Analysts usually use an 
integrated PRA computer program to establish the different types of risk importance 
measures in the importance ranking process. 
R&M Analysis 
Reliability engineering assesses the probability that a given component or system will 
operate as designed.  Maintainability engineering assesses and verifies the system design 
characteristics to reduce the need for maintenance and ensure downtime is minimized 
when maintenance action is necessary.  R&M analysis results are used to allocate design 
resources, focus operations on potential trouble areas, and identify requirements for spares 
inventories. 
Reliability engineering also includes a process called trending, which assesses the reliability 
performance of systems and components during their missions and identifies changes in 
reliability performance over time.  Through design evaluation, (probabilistic) modeling, 
analysis, and testing; reliability engineers work to improve the dependability of NASA 
systems.  Reliability analyses are used to support PRA and logistics. 
The following paragraphs summarize R&M services the Analysis Group provides as well as 
some of the R&M tools they use. 
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Physics of Failure Analysis identifies the underlying physical processes and mechanisms that 
cause failure.  This analysis helps minimize the risk of failures by enabling analysts and 
decision-makers to understand the relationship between failures and their driving 
parameters (environmental, manufacturing process, material defects, etc.).  Physics of 
failure analysis is useful throughout all phases of a program from technology development 
and design to operations. 
Root Cause Analysis ensures that problems are systematically evaluated and corrected.  The 
key element in a root cause analysis is a good Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
(PRACA) System.  PRACA is a closed-loop system for documenting hardware and 
software anomalies, analyzing their impact on R&M, and tracking them to their resolution.  
PRACA is a prime data source for program- and project-specific failure histories. 
Reliability Assurance Plans identify the activities essential in assuring reliability performance 
requirements are met during design, production, and product assurance activities.  These 
plans are written during program/project planning and apply throughout the 
program’s/project’s life.  Adherence to these plans ensures that design risks are balanced 
against the program’s/project’s constraints and objectives. 
Reliability Modeling uses prediction, allocation, and modeling tasks to identify inherent 
reliability characteristics.  Reliability modeling aids in evaluating the reliability of 
competing designs.  It is used in design and in operations when failure rates are needed for 
tradeoff studies, sparing analysis, etc.  Reliability modeling results are often used to 
establish procurement specifications. 
Trend Analysis examines past results and evaluates variation in data with the ultimate 
objective of forecasting future events.  Typically, trend analysis is used in the operational 
phase of a program to provide a means for assessing whether a system or component is in 
its break-in, operational, or wear-out phase.  Trend analysis is also useful in determining if 
an external factor is affecting a system or component. 
Regression Analysis evaluates the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables and generates an equation to describe the effect of one variable 
upon another.  The most commonly used method for modeling the relationship is least 
squares, but other methods are available.  The least squares method assesses the “statistical 
significance,” or the degree of confidence, that the true relationship is close to the 
estimated relationship.  Once the relationship, or model, between the variables is obtained, 
the model can be used to further investigate the root cause or to predict the value of the 
dependent variable. 
Reliability Growth is the improvement in a reliability parameter over a period of time due to 
changes in product design or the manufacturing process.  It occurs by surfacing failure 
modes and implementing effective corrective actions.  Reliability growth management 
involves systematically planning for reliability achievement as a function of time and other 
resources, and controlling the ongoing rate of achievement by reallocating these resources 
based on comparisons between planned and assessed reliability values. 
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Weibull Analysis matches historical failure and repair data to appropriate Weibull 
distributions.  These distributions represent the failure or repair characteristics of a given 
failure mode and may be assigned to failure models that are attached to blocks in a 
reliability block diagram or events in a fault tree diagram.  Weibull analysis results are 
typically given by two parameters that describe the distribution curve.  These parameters 
are β, the shape parameter, and η, the scale parameter (characteristic life).  β is useful in 
determining the failure characteristics of the data.  If the failure rate is increasing, then β is 
greater than 1; if the failure rate is decreasing, then β is less than 1; or if the failure rate is 
constant, then β equals 1. 
Simulation is a problem solving technique that approximates the probability of certain 
outcomes by running multiple trial runs, called simulations, using random variables.  
Simulation is often used when the system to be modeled is too complex to develop a 
closed-formed mathematical solution for the reliability problem.  The three classic types of 
reliability simulators are: Monte Carlo, reliability block diagram, and queuing. 
Data Collection, Analysis, and Management 
Data is the essential component (the life blood) of PRA and R&M analysis.  Various types 
of data must be collected and processed for use throughout the PRA process and in R&M 
analyses.  NASA gathers data from a variety of sources within and outside of NASA.  One 
of the primary data sources for each NASA program is its PRACA System.  The PRACA 
Database records typically provide the failure data for the program.  External data sources 
may include the Reliability Analysis Center Automated Databook’s Nonelectronic Parts 
Reliability Data and Electronic Parts Reliability Data, the National Transportation Safety 
Board, the Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing Reactor Reliability, and other 
sources.  The Analysis Group analyzes both internal and external data for the problem, 
system, or component under study to support PRAs and R&M analyses.  Once data is 
collected for a particular study, the Analysis Group stores or maintains the data so it can 
be retrieved and referenced for future purposes. 
Data collection and analysis proceeds in parallel, or in conjunction, with PRA and R&M 
analysis.  Data is assembled to quantify accident scenarios and contributors.  Data 
includes, but is not limited to, component failure rates, repair times, initiating event 
probabilities, structural failure probabilities, human error probabilities, process failure 
probabilities, and common cause failure probabilities.  Uncertainty bounds and uncertainty 
distributions are also collected and developed in the data collection process. 
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2008 ANALYSIS TASKS 
The Analysis Group supports projects and programs from the conceptual stage, through 
operations, and decommissioning.  JSC S&MA currently supports three major programs:  
SSP, ISS, and CxP.  The Analysis Group plays a primary role in supporting the Shuttle and 
Constellation Programs along with their Orbiter, Orion, Lunar Lander, and EVA Projects.  
The Analysis Group also supports the Mission Operations, Engineering, Life Sciences, and 
Flight Crew Directorates at JSC.  This report briefly summarizes the activities within each 
program the Analysis Group supports. 
Shuttle 
First launched in April 1981, the Shuttle is the only 
spacecraft capable of delivering and returning large payloads 
and scientific experiments to and from space.  It is 
scheduled for decommissioning in 2010 upon completion of 
the ISS construction.  Today, the Shuttle fleet is comprised 
of the Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour Orbiters.  Shuttle 
flights have supported both Space Station Mir and the ISS; 
deployed and serviced the Hubble Space Telescope; and 
deployed planetary spacecraft to study Jupiter, Venus, and 
the sun.  In the Orbiters’ onboard laboratories, hundreds of 
experiments have helped scientists study the effects of 
reduced gravity on materials, plants, animals, and human 
beings to benefit life on Earth. 
When describing the Analysis Group’s involvement with Shuttle support, it is important to 
first explain the Shuttle PRA because many of the risk trades and special assessments 
performed for the SSP use the Shuttle PRA results as a foundation.  The Shuttle PRA is 
the only PRA recognized by the SSP and NASA.  It is a “living” PRA that is periodically 
updated due to increased operation and failure history changes, operational procedures and 
process changes, or system design changes.  The Shuttle PRA was initially developed by a 
team of analysts and domain experts from across the SSP that were led by the Analysis 
Group.  Originally baselined in 2003, after peer review by an external team, the Shuttle 
PRA is now in its sixth update.  The Shuttle PRA includes over 10,000 pages of 
documentation, which is also maintained by the Analysis Group.  The Shuttle PRA 
represents a substantial amount of work and Shuttle knowledge integrated into a single 
assessment that has supported many SSP risk-informed decisions over the years and will 
support the remainder of the program. 
The following summaries highlight the PRA, R&M, and data management tasks the 
Analysis Group performed for the SSP in 2008. 
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Shuttle PRA Tasks 
Low Level Cutoff PRA 
The Engine Cutoff (ECO) sensors provide 
Low Level Cutoff (LLCO) protection for the 
Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs).  The 
fuel (liquid hydrogen) ECO sensors are 
located in the External Tank, and the oxidizer 
(liquid oxygen) ECO sensors are located in the 
Orbiter.  If either the fuel or oxidizer fluid 
levels drop below a certain point, the SSME 
turbo pumps may cavitate—resulting in a 
catastrophic event.  The liquid hydrogen ECO 
sensors have plagued the SSP in recent years.  
Following the Columbia accident and in 
preparation for STS-114, several liquid 
hydrogen ECO sensor failures were observed.  
Due to the ECO sensors’ wide-sweeping 
effects, significant analyses were performed 
across the program.  The Analysis Group 
performed a PRA for the ECO sensor scenarios based on the data available at that time 
and showed that common cause failures occurred when unexplained anomalies were added 
to the known failures.  The Analysis Group’s assessment focused on ECO sensor failures, 
and the probability of a LLCO was based upon a simple Chi-Square model using zero 
failures.  Although the assessment estimates were believed to be conservative at the time, a 
better estimate was not available. 
In December 2007, STS-122 experienced a complete loss of the liquid hydrogen ECO 
sensor system.  The Shuttle Program Manager asked the Analysis Group to provide a 
definitive estimate for the LLCO probability.  The LLCO model needed to provide enough 
detail to clearly show the impact of potential improvements such as increased Ascent 
Performance Margin (APM), and the model needed to be accepted by the SSP community.  
The Analysis Group lead a team that consisted of personnel from Johnson Space Center 
(JSC)/Kennedy Space Center (KSC)/Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) S&MA, SSME, 
Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I), Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR), 
NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), and Boeing to create a Monte Carlo model 
that simulated delta liquid hydrogen consumption.  A delta liquid hydrogen consumption 
greater than the available Flight Performance Reserve (FPR), Fuel Bias (FB), and APM will 
result in an LLCO.  The LLCO model results were presented to the Program 
Requirements Control Board (PRCB), and the SSP used the results to make informed 
decisions regarding the liquid hydrogen ECO sensor system. 
Simulated Mission 
ΔLH2 usage
Unusable
APM
Uncertainty Protection
Mission 
Requirements
ΔLH2 300 lbs
ΔLH2 1500 lbs
ΔLH2 -300 lbs
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Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Rescue Vehicle Release 
In October of 2008, NASA planned to service the HST.  
When adding the HST service mission to the manifest in 
2006, NASA decided to provide a rescue capability with 
a Shuttle waiting on the second launch pad since the ISS 
would not be available for Contingency Shuttle Crew 
Support (CSCS).  The planned HST rescue vehicle was 
the STS-126 vehicle, which was planned to launch 
November 10, 2008.  Due to the potential for launch 
delays, which could slip the STS-126 launch to within a 
beta window cutout beginning on November 29th and ending on December 17th; the 
Shuttle Program Manager considered releasing the HST rescue vehicle early to begin 
processing the vehicle for the STS-126 mission.  A beta window cutout is a period of time 
when the Shuttle cannot dock with the ISS due to thermal constraints.  Releasing the 
rescue vehicle early would make crew rescue unavailable if it were needed late in the 
mission (e.g., following late mission inspection).  The Analysis Group used a previously 
developed simulation model to assess manifest options as a basis for performing a 
schedule risk assessment to compare against the increased risk for Loss of Crew (LOC) 
due to losing the HST crew rescue capability for late mission “call-ups.”  The simulation 
model considered ground operations and the various risk contributors to launch 
availability, such as weather- and hardware failure-related delays.  The analysis results 
revealed the magnitude of the schedule risk improvement gained by releasing the rescue 
vehicle compared to the increase in HST LOC.  The HST rescue vehicle release analysis 
was instrumental in assisting the Shuttle Program Manager with making an informed 
decision not to release the HST rescue vehicle.  Ultimately, an HST failure delayed the 
HST mission to May 2009, and STS-126 was launched before the beta window cutout. 
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HST Repair Logistics 
When the HST service mission was added to 
the manifest in 2006, the rescue vehicle—which 
was also manifested along side the HST 
vehicle—was supposed to include a full 
complement of Thermal Protection System 
(TPS) repair kits.  The repair kits included a full 
set of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) plugs, 
an overlay kit, a Non-Oxide Adhesive 
Experimental (NOAX) repair kit, a Tile Repair 
Ablator Dispenser (T-RAD) kit, and an 
Emittance Primer Coating (EPC) repair kit.  A 
full complement of TPS repair kits would 
require the RCC plugs and overlay kit to either be manifested down from the ISS and 
returned following the HST mission or require another set to be manufactured.  Both 
options have significant cost associated with them; therefore, the plan became to manifest 
a standard set of repair kits on the rescue mission, which would not include the RCC plugs 
or the overlay kit.  If the rescue mission needed either of those repair kit items, they would 
have to be transferred from the HST vehicle.  The new plan increases the risk to the 
rescue vehicle if the exact same repair that is done for the HST vehicle is needed for the 
rescue vehicle.  In May of 2008, the HST Mission Director asked the Analysis Group to 
provide the probability that the rescue mission would need either an RCC plug or an 
overlay kit given that either one had been used on the HST vehicle and failed—therefore 
requiring a rescue mission in the first place.  The Analysis Group was able to fulfill this 
request and showed the probability was small; therefore, requiring the rescue vehicle to 
carry a full complement of TPS repair kits is unnecessary. 
HST Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Assessment 
The MMOD risk for the HST mission is significantly higher than the MMOD risk 
associated with an ISS mission due to the altitude of the HST vehicle and the attitude the 
Orbiter must fly to perform the HST repairs.  Therefore, NASA has put forth a 
considerable amount of thought and effort into mitigating the HST mission MMOD risk.  
One of the more effective mitigations is to perform an Orbit Adjust, which would place 
the Orbiter in a lower altitude and lower the debris flux after the HST repair mission is 
complete. 
NASA’s Astromaterials Research and Exploration Science Group 
assessed the HST MMOD risk with and without assuming an 
Orbit Adjust, and the Analysis Group presented the delta risk to 
the Orbit Flight Techniques Panel (OFTP) as compared to the 
Shuttle PRA top risks.  The Analysis Group emphasized that 
although the delta risk may appear small when compared to the 
overall MMOD risk, it is a significant risk when viewed by itself.  
Based on the Analysis Group’s presentation of the delta risks, the 
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OFTP changed their opinion from being in favor of not performing the Orbit Adjust to in 
favor of performing the Orbit Adjust since there is only a small risk increase associated 
with reduced emergency landing sight coverage.  The current plan is to nominally perform 
the Orbit Adjust for the HST mission. 
Crew Rescue Analysis for STS-122, 123, 124, and 126 
After the loss of Columbia (STS-107), NASA requires Flight Day 2 (FD 2) inspections to 
survey TPS damage on the Orbiter.  Depending on the severity of the TPS damage, the 
Mission Management Team (MMT) decides whether to repair the damage on orbit or 
declare CSCS on the ISS, which requires a rescue mission by a standby Shuttle.  Prior to 
STS-118, the MMT asked the Analysis Group to evaluate the likelihood of a successful 
crew rescue attempt if the crew had to perform CSCS on the ISS.  The MMT requested 
this study to help them make risk-informed decisions about whether to declare CSCS in 
emergency deorbit scenarios after the FD 2 inspections.  In addition, the MMT could have 
also used this study to weigh the risks if they were faced with the decision to repair the 
TPS damage or declare CSCS for STS-118. 
The STS-118 crew rescue analysis showed that crew rescue success is dominated by the 
potential for a launch delay that is greater than the stay on the ISS since the ISS has limited 
consumables such as oxygen.  The STS-118 analysis also showed that crew rescue is 
heavily dependent on the rescue vehicle’s status in processing at the time of launch.  As a 
result of the effort and findings from the STS-118 analysis, the MMT asked the Analysis 
Group to continue providing this assessment for each subsequent mission as a risk metric. 
In 2008, the Analysis Group provided crew rescue estimates for four missions, STS-122, 
STS-123, STS-124 and STS-126.  The most notable was the analysis performed for  
STS-124, because there was a gap between the CSCS duration on the ISS and the Launch 
on Need (LON) vehicle processing time.  To close the gap and show a positive CSCS 
margin for reducing the risk, credit was given for progress resupply and the new Oxygen 
Generation System (OGS) on the ISS.  The STS-124 crew rescue analysis also showed how 
the crew rescue risk can be improved by sending the crew home on the Soyuz.  In addition 
to the standard crew rescue analysis for STS-126, the Analysis Group also provided a 
histogram of the crew rescue risk analyses since STS-118 to aid in comparing the current 
mission risk to past missions. 
MMOD Late Inspection Benefit Analysis 
In 2003, NASA began on-orbit inspections of the Orbiter to reduce the risk from ascent 
debris and/or MMOD damage.  Late inspection is at risk periodically because it is 
manifested near the end of the mission and previous mission events may require more time 
than expected; thus, late inspection is a candidate for removal due to mission schedule 
reasons as the crew’s life support systems approach their limits.  Late inspection is on the 
Analysis Group’s list of assessments for each mission to keep Shuttle management aware 
of the potential risks when decisions to change and/or remove late inspection arise. 
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Safety Problem Investigation Team Support 
The Safety Problem Investigation Team (SPIT) was created after the Columbia accident to 
serve as a realtime responder to Shuttle and related ISS anomalies that occur from the 
beginning of the launch countdown to completion of post landing procedures.  The SPIT 
supports a formal process for providing results, conclusions, and recommendations to the 
S&MA MMT representative.  The SPIT also provides summary information to the Safety 
Mission Evaluation Room (MER) console for disclosure to the MER manager and other 
MER console positions. 
The Analysis Group provides support to the SPIT by creating fault trees to help diagnose 
the root causes of an anomaly (i.e., “Cause Trees”), or by providing requested probabilities 
from the Shuttle PRA.  During STS-124, the Analysis Group developed a “Cause Tree” for 
the “Left Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) Secondary Thrust Vector Control (TVC) 
Reads Zero” anomaly.  During STS-123, the fuel tank pressure on Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) 1 was decaying.  The flight rules directed the APU should run to depletion in case 
the pressure decay was the result of a hydrazine leak.  However, if the APU was allowed to 
run to depletion; only two APUs would be available for entry, which also posed a risk.  
Therefore, the SPIT requested the Analysis Group to provide various probabilities to 
assist in deciding whether to run APU 1 to depletion.  These SPIT analysis activities are 
just two examples of SPIT support the Analysis Group provided in 2008.  The Analysis 
Group will continue to provide this much needed support to the SPIT for each flight. 
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Power Bus Isolation Supply Analysis 
During the STS-124 Flight Readiness Review, the 
SRB Project Office brought forward the status of 
an ongoing analysis that was being conducted for a 
broken wire in a T2 transformer within the SRB 
Power Bus Isolation Supply (PBIS) module.  The 
PBIS module provides SRB bus power to Criticality 
3 instrumentation.  Although the broken wire was 
associated with a non-critical pin within the T2 
transformer, the failure mode was applicable to a 
critical pin.  If a similar failure occurred during 
flight to a critical pin, the resulting open circuit 
would lead to a short that would cause an SRB Bus 
loss (worst case) or a Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) 
loss (more likely case).  Common cause failure 
would result in losing two HPUs, which would lead 
to Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV).  When 
inspecting the 12 T2 transformers, 43% of the 
applicable T2 transformer pins showed indications 
of cracks.  The Analysis Group used the crack and 
short data, along with demonstrated flight history, 
to assess the risk on STS-124, STS-125, and  
 2008 Annual Report 13 
STS-126.  The Analysis Group’s assessment 
results were compared to the SRB Project 
Office assessment as well as an MSFC 
S&MA assessment.  The major difference 
between the Analysis Group assessment and 
the SRB Project Office assessment is that 
the Analysis Group assumed the failure rate 
is increasing overtime (i.e., older PBIS 
modules have a higher probability of failure 
than younger PBIS modules).  This 
comparison highlighted the amount of uncertainty associated with assessing the Shuttle 
risk associated with PBIS failure.  Although the SSP accepted the risk associated with a 
broken wire in the SRB T2 transformer for the next four flights, the Analysis Group’s 
assessment emphasized the need to implement a design change that would eliminate the 
failure in future flights. 
Shuttle PRA Update, Iteration 3.0 
The Analysis Group completed a major update to the Shuttle PRA in 2008.  This update 
included a complete overhaul of the functional data to have traceability of the pre-priors.  
Pre-priors are data sources that are used to develop a prior that is then either used in the 
Shuttle PRA or is Bayesian updated with Shuttle-specific data.  The Iteration 3.0 update 
also expanded the Shuttle PRA model scope to include aborts and rendezvous and 
docking.  Preliminary Shuttle PRA results were presented to the PRCB in May 2008 as part 
of the Shuttle Top Risk Review.  After receiving feedback during the PRCB presentation, 
updates were made to Iteration 3.0 and the results were finalized in November 2008.  The 
Analysis Group initiated review summits in December 2008 with the Orbiter Project 
Office, Mission Operations Directorate, and Safety and Mission Assurance; which are 
scheduled to be complete in January 2009.  Feedback from the review summits will be 
incorporated into an Iteration 3.1 update that is due out in 2009. 
Flight Software PRA 
The Analysis Group developed a methodology for assessing Shuttle Flight Software (FSW) 
risk.  The Shuttle FSW PRA takes into account over 30 years of SSP quality management 
data from United Space Alliance (USA), including ground (simulation), flight testing, and 
verification data.  The FSW PRA also takes into account different production and 
execution rates of new and latent errors as well as the maturing of the FSW test and 
verification process.  Using the FSW PRA estimates, the Analysis Group was able to 
establish a range of LOC probabilities from Orbital Increment (OI)1 through OI30 
(current).  The Analysis Group’s FSW PRA was compared to USA’s LOC risk assessment, 
and the two were deemed not to be statistically different.  The results and methodologies 
in the Analysis Group’s FSW PRA were well accepted within the Shuttle and Constellation 
Programs.  The FSW PRA results will be used in the next iteration of the Shuttle PRA.  
Constellation is using the Shuttle FSW PRA as a benchmark to assist in determining the 
best methodology for analyzing Constellation software risk. 
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Precursor Analysis 
The Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (OSMA) at NASA Headquarters requested the 
Analysis Group and other SSP S&MA entities combine efforts to perform a precursor 
analysis pilot project.  A precursor is an indication of a problem that could recur with 
more severe consequences.  An example of a precursor is a hydrazine leak, indicative of a 
loose fitting, which if not corrected, could lead to a larger leak and fire. 
Information Systems Lab (ISL), a contractor for NASA Headquarters’ OSMA, developed 
an initial precursor analysis process that was based on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) established procedures.  The ISL initial precursor analysis process was 
tested and refined by evaluating Shuttle Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control 
System (OMS/RCS) Corrective Action Reports in a collaborative workshop held at JSC 
November 13-16, 2007.  A follow-on workshop to this precursor screening/disposition 
exercise was held March 3-7, 2008.  This precursor screening/disposition exercise focused 
on In-Flight Anomalies (IFAs) generated from STS-114 through STS-116 and included 
input from JSC System Engineers, the Analysis Group, other personnel from JSC S&MA, 
and ISL.  IFAs were dispositioned as no action, trend, or further analysis.  Rule-based 
screening guidelines created during the first workshop were further developed to facilitate 
the quick disposition of anomalies.  JSC support made this exercise a success by generating 
significant technical discussions and identifying process improvements. 
Shuttle R&M Tasks 
SRB Parachute Material Reliability Analysis 
The SRB parachutes provide the means for decelerating the 
SRB and allowing it to impact the water at an acceptable speed.  
Each SRB has one pilot, one drogue, and three main 
parachutes.  The Analysis Group conducted an assessment to 
examine the reliability of the SRB large main and drogue 
parachute material. 
Using the failure history for both types of parachutes, logistic 
regression analysis confirmed the SRB large main parachutes 
have shown reliability growth since their introduction and have 
achieved a high level of reliability.  The analysis also confirmed 
the drogue chutes are at a high level of reliability.  The results 
of this analysis will be used to support the recovery system 
design for the CxP. 
 2008 Annual Report 15 
Orbiter Problem Trend and Risk Analysis Report 
The Analysis Group prepares the JSC PRACA data for trending analysis bi-annually to 
ensure the most current Corrective Action Reports (CARs) are included in the analysis.  
The Analysis Group sends all new records to the S&MA Subsystem Engineers.  The 
engineers screen the records and add information relevant to trending.  After engineering 
review, the Analysis Group incorporates the new records in the existing database.  The 
Analysis Group then performs two statistical analyses.  The first analysis identifies part 
groups with significantly increasing rates of problem occurrence in the form of a trend 
score.  The second analysis assigns a risk age index of high, medium, or low to each open 
CAR.  Any part group with a significantly increasing trend score or high risk open CAR is 
reviewed by an S&MA Subsystem Engineer and included in the bi-annual Orbiter Problem 
Trend and Risk Analysis Report.  This report is submitted to the Orbiter Project Office to 
assist them in identifying areas that should be investigated on the Orbiter. 
Additionally, the Analysis Group is investigating text data mining tools and techniques to 
assist in identifying longstanding and recurring problems that present a risk to the 
remaining flights. 
Point Sensor Box Analysis 
The Point Sensor Box (PSB) is used in the Orbiter’s Main Propulsion System (MPS) to 
monitor eight liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen sensors, known as level or point sensors, 
that are used when filling the External Tank.  The PSB determines whether the level (or 
point) sensors are wet or dry.  The PSB also monitors four liquid hydrogen and four liquid 
oxygen ECO sensors, called depletion sensors, and translates the sensors states into 
messages to the Orbiter’s General Purpose Computers (GPCs).  The GPCs use the sensor 
states to shut down the SSMEs in the event a propellant quantity is depleted prior to 
nominal Main Engine Cutoff (MECO). 
The Analysis Group analyzed the anomaly history of all seven PSB flight units to estimate 
the accumulated operating time, the failure rate trend, and the conditional reliability of the 
PSBs during the launch pad and flight time periods.  This analysis also assessed the aging 
factors of the electronic components in the PSBs. 
Failure data indicates the PSBs may be in an early wear out phase and their reliability may 
deteriorate as additional operation time accumulates.  However, an examination of the PSB 
key electronic components shows no appreciable aging in the components.  All 
components are high-quality, established reliability parts that have been vigorously 
qualified and tested.  The PSB analysis results were used to gain a better understanding 
about the recurrent Shuttle ECO sensor problem and to determine if the PSBs could be 
eliminated as a contributing source to the ECO sensor failures. 
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Shuttle Data Management Tasks 
The Analysis Group developed two new 
databases, one geared toward PRA activities 
and the other geared toward R&M activities.  
The PRA database is a searchable Access® 
relational database that brings together the 
major elements of the current Shuttle PRA 
functional data set (e.g., generic priors, 
Bayes-Beta, Bayes-Gamma, and failure 
report classes).  The new PRA database also 
has the capacity to accommodate additional 
failure rates, CARs, and operational 
information.  In addition to the Access database, the Analysis Group created a new set of 
comprehensive Excel® files that provide detailed information on the pedigree of the 
Shuttle PRA likelihood data.  The pedigree information includes operation time (or 
demands), the rational for relevant failures, related discounting, etc. 
The new R&M database is an Excel database that consolidates the JSC S&MA R&M 
input/output data into a menu-driven database that uses a modified vertical-based 
taxonomy from the Logistics Asset Tracking System.  
The new JSC S&MA PRA and R&M databases provide an improved level of traceability, 
maintainability, and configurability.  These databases were presented to the SSP Risk and 
Reliability Managers and were well received within the JSC S&MA Office; therefore, they 
will be used to sustain the analysis needs for upcoming manned/unmanned NASA 
programs and projects. 
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Constellation 
NASA’s CxP is building the next generation of spacecraft for human exploration.  The 
Orion crew exploration vehicle will launch on the Ares I launch vehicle.  The Ares V will 
launch cargo for lunar missions.  The CxP was established to return humans to the moon 
by 2020 to set up a lunar outpost in preparation for journeys to Mars and other 
destinations in the solar system.  Orion will be capable of carrying crew and cargo to the 
ISS.  It will also be able to rendezvous with the Lunar Lander and Earth Departure Stage 
to carry crews to the moon.  Eventually, Orion will be used to transfer crews to Mars-
bound vehicles. 
Since the CxP and its projects are in the 
beginning stages; the majority of 
Constellation tasks/efforts are in the early 
stages of design, testing, construction, and 
some are even in their early definition 
phases.  The Analysis Group has been 
involved in many of these tasks/efforts to 
ensure S&MA products/processes are 
correctly implemented within the CxP and 
its projects.  The following task summaries 
recap some of the more significant 
Constellation PRA and R&M tasks the 
Analysis Group performed during 2008. 
Constellation PRA Tasks 
Developing Risk Assessment Methods 
Since spaceflight is so unique, many of the identified risks require unique solutions to 
understand them and estimate their risk.  In the SSP, unique models for ascent debris risk, 
MMOD risk, and other special cases were developed and incorporated into the traditional 
PRA model.  For Constellation, new methods are also being developed to ensure the risks 
in the new program are understood and minimized.  Two new methods are being 
developed to estimate software risk and to apply common cause in the Constellation risk 
models. 
The Constellation Program Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Methodology Document, CxP 70017 
specifies that software will be incorporated in the PRA models, but does not specify the 
methodology for conducting a software PRA.  Software risk has not typically been 
addressed in PRA models because there is no accepted method to evaluate it.  The history 
of spaceflight shows that software risk is not negligible and should be accounted for in a 
comprehensive risk model.  For new vehicles, like those being designed for Constellation, 
software risk will be high initially since it is untested in the field until the first flight.  
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Latent errors may take some time to detect and correct.  Therefore, the Analysis Group 
has been involved in developing and evaluating Constellation software risk methods.  As 
previously mentioned in the Shuttle task summaries, the Analysis Group developed an 
empirical software risk model that is based on over 30 years of Shuttle software failure 
data.  Since the software model is an empirical model based on Shuttle data, it is not 
necessarily translatable to evaluate Constellation software risk.  However, the Shuttle 
empirical software risk model is being used as a benchmark to evaluate different existing 
general methodologies in Constellation’s quest to find the best method for analyzing 
software risk. 
Current modeling shows common cause (generic failures) to be a risk driver for some of 
the Constellation systems.  The Analysis Group is leading the effort to ensure consistent 
modeling across all Constellation projects.  In addition, current common cause methods 
being used rely on generic data from non-aerospace industries.  New methods are being 
developed to tailor the modeling to the specific components and environments seen in 
Constellation to ensure the most accurate risk rankings and risk estimations possible. 
These are just two of several areas in which new methods are being developed for 
Constellation risk assessments.  Other developing methods include abort simulation and 
reliability growth for launch vehicles.  The Analysis Group will continue to participate in 
the development of new methods as needed to ensure the best analyses are being 
performed and the most accurate risk estimates are used for design decisions. 
Constellation Loss of Crew/Loss of Mission Requirements 
The Analysis Group is leading an ongoing assessment to determine the achievability of the 
Loss of Crew (LOC) and Loss of Mission (LOM) requirements in the Constellation 
Architecture Requirements Document (CARD), CxP 70000.  The assessment began by 
developing a timeline of hazards for both the ISS mission and the Lunar Sortie mission.  
The hazard timeline was constructed in the form of workshops with expert participation 
from project offices, SR&QA, Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), etc.  Five 
workshops have been conducted to date: 
• Ares I cryo loading through orbit insertion 
• ISS mission from orbit insertion through landing 
• Lunar Sortie mission from Low Earth Orbit docking through landing 
• Ares I and Orion ground operations from vendor/government hardware turnover to 
cryo loading 
• Contingency EVA 
The products of these workshops are timelines (as shown on the next page) of critical 
functions and the hazards associated with the functions.  The Integrated Hazard Analysis 
Team used these timelines and associated hazards to develop event tree models for the 
integrated LOC/LOM models.  These hazard timelines will also be beneficial in 
determining if any gaps exist in the project LOC/LOM models and to ensure all integrated 
LOC/LOM analyses are performed.  
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The current LOC/LOM integrated analysis incorporates project-developed models from 
Orion, Ares, and Lunar Lander.  Detailed event tree models were developed based on the 
current mission operational concepts.  The models incorporate conditional probabilities 
for aborts related to the conditional probabilities that a failure is catastrophic from a blast, 
debris, or thermal considerations for each Ares I failure, as well as the Orion flight 
performance considerations based on the initial conditions of the Ares I failure.  The 
Orion models are based on the August 25, 2008, Orion model drop.  The Ares I model is 
based on the Ares I Preliminary Design Review (PDR) design.  The Lunar Lander fault 
tree models are developed based on the Lunar Lander Design Analysis Cycle 2 vehicle. 
The integrated LOC/LOM analyses results provide an integrated risk ranking of the 
project models.  In addition, a list of gaps can be developed where risks are present but 
not yet accounted for in the project models.  The integrated LOC/LOM analyses also 
allow the CxP and its projects to determine if the CxP’s requirements are being achieved 
or are impractical to achieve.  The Analysis Group will continue to conduct these 
integrated LOC/LOM analyses as the Constellation projects, associated vehicles, and 
missions evolve. 
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ARES I-X Range Safety PRA 
The Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Working Group (PRAWG) was 
chartered in early 2007 as the 
forum through which all launch 
vehicle range safety-related 
reliability analyses and products 
would be coordinated for the CxP.  
This technical forum supports the 
Launch Constellation Range Safety 
Panel (LCRSP) in all matters 
related to estimating vehicle failure 
probabilities for range safety risk 
assessments in compliance with the 
requirements of the CxP, NASA’s 
Range Safety Program (as defined 
in NASA Procedural Requirement 8715.5), and applicable Air Force Range Safety policies 
and requirements.  Members of the Analysis Group participate in the PRAWG, along with 
representatives from the Launch Vehicle Project Office (Ares, Ares I-X), Mission 
Operations, S&MA, and the 45th Space Wing. 
The PRAWG completed a number of tasks in 2008 to support the Ares I-X fight test 
vehicle.  In particular, the group coordinated all tasks pertaining to the final Ares I-X 
range safety PRA, which was provided to the United States Air Force to be part of the 
Ares I-X final flight data package.  The Ares I-X PRA was developed by S&MA personnel 
at JSC (which includes the JSC S&MA Analysis Group), MSFC, and Langley Research 
Center (LaRC). 
The Ares I-X range safety PRA was a new challenge because Ares I-X is the first of a kind 
vehicle.  Historically, a vehicle’s first flight is usually significantly riskier than mature 
vehicles due the unknowns associated with first flight.  The PRAWG is developing a new 
process to estimate a first flight failure probability based on PRA models that are normally 
developed to estimate mature system risk.  The methodology being developed links the 
mature vehicle risk estimate from the PRA model to the empirically derived first flight risk 
of 0.3 for experienced rocket developers, and adjusts the PRA result based on the 
difference in complexity of the new vehicle to the generic vehicle risk of 0.3.  The work 
and collaboration between NASA and the 45th Space Wing on this issue will continue to 
evolve. 
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Orion Launch Abort System PRA 
As part of the Orion Launch Abort System 
development effort, several flight tests are planned to 
prove concepts and operational capabilities.  Pad Abort 
1 (PA-1) is the first flight test and is scheduled for 2009 
at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR).  As part of 
this test, the risk to personnel, high value facilities, and 
the general public must be addressed to ensure the risks 
are within Army requirements.  Using standard 
accepted PRA methods, the Analysis Group estimated 
the risk associated with the PA-1 flight test as it relates 
to range safety at WSMR.  In particular, the Analysis 
Group’s PA-1 PRA estimated the risk associated with 
three separate zones defined to categorize potential off-
nominal debris that could occur during the PA-1 flight 
test.  The PA-1 PRA provides estimates for each off-nominal debris zone with and without 
first flight adjustment factors.  First flight adjustment factors were included to account for 
the lower reliabilities associated with a new vehicle’s first launch. 
The PA-1 PRA results were submitted to WSMR to incorporate in their casualty 
expectation analysis.  Based on the outcome of their analysis results, WSMR will decide 
whether to proceed with the PA-1 flight test. 
Orion Lunar Sortie PRA Review 
As the developing contractor, Lockheed Martin is 
required to submit an Orion Lunar Sortie PRA as a 
PDR deliverable.  The Analysis Group is responsible for 
reviewing this PRA.  The Orion Lunar Sortie is a 
complex PRA since it includes the integration of many 
sophisticated and unique systems as well as covers 
several mission phases.  Therefore, Lockheed Martin 
has committed to making several status drops of the 
PRA to help ease communication and understanding 
between Lockheed Martin and the Analysis Group as 
the PRA is being developed.  The status drops and open 
communication should reduce the amount of Review 
Item Discrepancies (RIDs) and comments during the 
Orion PDR. 
The first Orion Lunar Sortie PRA drop occurred on July 21, 2008.  The main objective in 
this PRA review was to demonstrate to Lockheed Martin the Analysis Group’s 
expectations for the PDR by treating this status review as if it were in a formal review 
process.  In this status review, the Analysis Group was able to familiarize Lockheed Martin 
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with the criteria by which they would be judging the Orion Lunar Sortie PRA as well as all 
subsequent PRAs during the PDR.  An additional benefit to this status review was the 
Analysis Group used this exercise as a means to provide additional training to its PRA 
analysts in the formal PRA review process.  Review comments were submitted to 
Lockheed Martin.  The Analysis Group emphasized how the review comments should not 
be viewed as shortcomings (especially since the PRA was in its beginning stages), but 
should be the focus of concentration when continuing to develop the Orion Lunar Sortie 
PRA for PDR.  Another status drop is scheduled for February 13, 2009.  During that 
review, the Analysis Group will verify their comments are being addressed and continue to 
communicate with Lockheed Martin on the development of the Orion Lunar Sortie PRA. 
Orion Post-Landing Emergency Egress Study 
The Ground and Mission Operations (GMO) Systems Integration Group (SIG) conducted 
a trade study to evaluate the post-landing emergency egress design on the Orion 
spacecraft.  As part of their study, the GMO SIG asked the Analysis Group to identify 
events that would require the crew to exit the spacecraft prior to the arrival of the rescue 
crew.  In addition, the GMO SIG asked the Analysis Group to quantify the probability of 
occurrence for the events they identified. 
The Analysis Group generated a list of credible scenarios that would require an emergency 
egress, such as water entering the vehicle through various ports and vents; off-nominal 
conditions inside the vehicle such as smoke, fire, explosion, noxious substance 
contamination, and carbon dioxide build-up; failure to release the parachutes post-landing; 
vehicle righting bag failure; etc.  The Analysis Group then created a PRA model to 
quantify the probability of occurrence for each event in the credible scenario list.  They 
used NASA heritage data to develop component failure probabilities, and they worked 
with meteorologists and the MSFC to assess the probabilities for the phenomenological 
events (e.g., sea states and sea conditions that would cause the vehicle to roll into an 
upside down position). 
The Analysis Group performed the emergency egress assessment to help the GMO SIG 
understand the events that would lead to an emergency egress and their likelihood of 
occurrence, but the Analysis Group also identified mitigations that might reduce those 
probabilities.  The GMO SIG incorporated the results of this assessment into their trade 
study.  One of the most critical findings was that one of the valve openings in the vehicle 
would lead to nearly unabated flooding in the Orion spacecraft if the vehicle rolled to an 
upside down position.  Based on experience with the Apollo missions, it was determined 
this event was very likely to occur.  The Analysis Group presented this finding to the 
Constellation Analysis Working Group and Lockheed Martin Engineering, and a redesign 
of the valve is now being evaluated as part of the next Orion Design Analysis Cycle study. 
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Lunar Lander Design Analysis Cycle PRAs 
The early design of the Lunar Lander (Altair) vehicle is separated into a series of design 
iterations called design analysis cycles.  Lunar Lander Design Analysis Cycle (LDAC) 1 was 
devoted to designing a minimally functional vehicle; which provided systems that 
contained no provisions for mission reliability or safety such as redundancy.  The common 
understanding was the LDAC 1 vehicle would never be used and that system safety and 
reliability would be added in subsequent design iterations. 
The LDAC 2 vehicle design targeted 
the LOC probability or crew safety.  
The goal of LDAC 2 was to decrease 
the LOC probability by increasing the 
reliability of each Altair system.  The 
approach chosen was to perform a 
series of design architecture trade 
studies that involved each Altair system 
and subsystem and also include a 
consideration of system reliability as 
the figure of merit. 
These rapidly progressing trade studies required quick turnaround reliability analysis results 
to support decision-making in a dynamic project environment.  Therefore, the Analysis 
Group chose a streamlined, spreadsheet-based version of PRA to inform each of the 
concurrent design studies.  Rapid response products included near realtime identification 
of risk drivers and a quick look at LOC probability versus Altair mass comparative 
(between each proposed architecture) estimates.  The results from these trade studies were 
used to inform the decisions that led to the closure of the LDAC 2 Altair design.  The 
LDAC 2 final analysis results indicate a LOC probability improvement of two orders of 
magnitude.  This rapid turnaround risk-informed design analysis process attracted 
favorable attention throughout the CxP and NASA.  The analysis process and results were 
briefed to numerous groups within NASA, including the OSMA Associate Administrator 
and the NASA Chief Engineer. 
The LDAC 3 vehicle design targeted mission reliability, as measured in terms of the LOM 
probability.  The goal of LDAC 3 was to decrease the LOM probability to a level more in 
line with the Constellation requirement.  Once again, a series of design trade studies was 
deployed and the Analysis Group employed the rapid turnaround spreadsheet reliability 
estimator.  As with LDAC 2, the spreadsheet reliability estimator identified risk drivers and 
provided insight into the relative risk reductions associated with various system 
configurations.  Final results for LDAC 3 are still in work, but preliminary estimates 
indicate an improvement of one order of magnitude.  The preliminary results also indicate 
the Constellation LOM probability requirement may not be practical.  The Analysis Group 
will continue to work with Constellation to resolve these Altair LDAC 3 issues. 
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Constellation R&M Tasks 
Constellation Reliability Availability Maintainability Panel Support 
The Constellation Reliability Availability Maintainability (RAM) Panel oversees the 
implementation and verification of all CxP RAM requirements as well as provides 
expertise for RAM technical assessments and issues.  The Constellation RAM Panel also 
coordinates with the Constellation Safety and Engineering Review Panel (CSERP); CxP 
PRA Panel; Program Integration, Design, Test, and Systems Engineering; as well as the 
CxP and its project offices to recommend approvals for RAM products and processes; 
collaborate for community best of practices; and participate in other collaborative 
Constellation activities.  The Constellation RAM Panel includes members of the Analysis 
Group, but the Analysis Group also provides modeling and analysis services for the 
Constellation RAM Panel. 
The Analysis Group’s support to the 
Constellation RAM Panel in 2008 
included developing a simulation tool 
to evaluate the relationship between 
availability for operation versus 
downtime due to failure and repair.  
Currently, a data set is being developed 
for input in a Raptor™ software model 
to simulate the failure and repair of 
components within the Constellation 
elements during a mission.  The input 
data set includes Orion subsystem 
reliability block diagrams and the functions involved in a mission.  The primary output 
from the Raptor model is “availability” of various subsystems/functions over the entire 
mission.  The purpose of the analysis is to determine unavailability drivers and focus on 
potential areas to increase availability. 
An additional service the Analysis Group provided for the Constellation RAM Panel in 
2008 is the development of an Excel-based database that aggregates reliability data from all 
the Constellation projects to be used for integration purposes at the program level.  The 
goal is to standardize the name of items that have been judged relevant to both the 
program and project RAM and PRA analyses.  The database has the ability to retrieve the 
data pedigree (e.g., failure rate/mean time to failure) through self-contained hyperlinks.  
The database is flexible and can grow to support the needs of the Constellation RAM 
activities. 
The analysis Group will continue to participate in and provide expert analytical services to 
the Constellation RAM Panel in 2009. 
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Constellation Panel and Working Group Support 
The Analysis Group participates in and supports several other Constellation panels and 
working groups both at the program and project level.  The types of activities performed 
for these panels and working groups is to perform technical assessments as requested, 
facilitate issue resolution based on assessment findings, provide expert opinions, and 
review documents.  The following are example activities performed for the Constellation 
panels and working groups in 2008: 
• Conducted research and made comparisons between ammonia and Freon for 
incorporation into a trade study that determined whether the weight reduction 
provided by using ammonia instead of Freon is offset by the dangers of having 
ammonia on the vehicle.  This research and comparison assisted in identifying the 
necessary precautions and controls for using ammonia. 
• Provided input for the change request to improve existing requirements in the 
Constellation Program Integrated Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
Requirements Document, CxP 70059.  Many of the Analysis Group’s inputs were 
considered and incorporated into the document, resulting in stronger R&M 
requirements for the CxP. 
• Compared NASA-wide and CxP-specific requirements to the developing contractor’s 
documents/plans to identify any omissions or shortcomings in meeting either the 
agency’s or program’s requirements.  The developing contractor documents/plans 
reviewed included:  R&M plans and reports, maintainability and supportability 
outlines, and PDR planning presentation. 
• Provided expert opinion to assist SE&I in developing the data for their launch 
availability model. 
Orion Service Module Fairing Analysis 
The Service Module (SM) fairings are panels that cover and protect the SM components.  
These panels are load-bearing panels in the SM structure.  The Constellation Group in 
JSC’s Program Engineering Integration Office was tasked to conduct the SM Load Bearing 
Study, where the objective was to investigate cost-effective methods for maintaining the 
components under the SM fairings during ground processing.  In their efforts to conduct 
the cost-benefit portion of this study, the Constellation Group asked the Analysis Group 
to estimate the likelihood that the components housed under the SM fairings would 
require maintenance.  The Analysis Group derived the probability of a maintenance event 
using exposure times and component failure rates.  Failure rates were determined for over 
1,200 SM components using NASA heritage data and commercial data sources.  The 
failure rates estimated with commercial data sources were normalized to account for the 
space environment and associated manufacturing quality.  Once the component failure 
probabilities (or maintenance event probabilities) were determined, the Analysis Group 
ranked the top contributors.  The Analysis Group submitted their results to the 
Constellation Group and the Orion SR&QA Panel to assist in the decision-making process 
for modifying the current SM fairing design. 
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ANALYSIS GROUP STAFF 
The Analysis Group always strives to produce the highest quality services and products in 
a timely and cost-effective manner.  The experience base within the Analysis Group staff 
provides the group with the utmost risk and reliability experience in performing 
assessments and analyzing data for the majority of NASA’s current and future space 
exploration activities. 
The Analysis Group is comprised of the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch staff and S&MA 
support services contractors.  The JSC S&MA Analysis Branch staff serves as the lead for 
the various Shuttle and Constellation analysis tasks performed within the Shuttle and 
Exploration Division, and the support services contractors perform numerous analytical 
activities on behalf of the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch. 
JSC S&MA Analysis Branch 
The chart below displays the organizational structure for the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch.  
A professional biography summarizing each JSC S&MA Analysis Branch member’s 
qualifications and accomplishments is also provided. 
 
JSC S&MA Analysis Branch 
Roger Boyer, Chief 
Risk & Reliability Analysis Group 
Bob Cross, Lead 
Constellation Program Support Space Shuttle Program Support 
Teri Hamlin, Shuttle PRA Lead 
Mark Valentine, R&M and Ascent Debris 
Bob Cross, CxP PRA Lead 
Mike Stewart, Senior PRA Analyst 
Henk Roelant, Orion R&M and Software Reliability 
Mark Bigler, EVA and Abort  
Scott Winter, Lunar Lander 
Data Collection, Analysis, Management 
Bruce Reistle, Data Lead 
Dr. Dick Heydorn, R&M and COPV 
 2008 Annual Report 27 
Roger Boyer — Analysis Branch Chief 
Roger has a Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in both Nuclear Engineering and Mechanical 
Engineering from the University of Missouri—Rolla.  He holds a Master of Science (M.S.) 
in Nuclear Engineering also from the University of Missouri—Rolla.  He worked for the 
Union Electric Company at the Callaway Nuclear Plant for three summers in nuclear 
construction, plant engineering, and nuclear safety analysis, respectively.  He then joined 
Houston Lighting and Power (HL&P) Company on the South Texas Project (STP) in 1983, 
performing accident analyses in the Nuclear Safety Analysis group and developing the STP 
PRA.  As a PRA analyst, he performed system analyses of several plant systems, developed 
ESDs and event trees for several initiating events, assisted with the human actions analysis 
and external events analysis efforts, was responsible for the overall quantification of the 
plant model, and performed a comprehensive risk-based technical specification assessment 
for submittal to the NRC.  From 1990 to 1994, he developed a high-fidelity thermal-
hydraulic simulation of the Space Station Freedom Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) 
for the McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company and served as the task manager for 
the ATCS advanced automation fault detection, isolation, and recovery system project.  
From 1994 to 1997, he returned to HL&P, where he led the in-house development of its 
thermal-hydraulic-related nuclear fuel reload safety analyses, performed several computer 
code verifications, and co-authored a Westinghouse topical report to the NRC. 
In 1997, Roger joined the JSC SR&QA prime contractor (SAIC) as a Senior PRA Analyst 
and soon became manager of its Shuttle Analysis section, directing PRA, trending, and 
reliability analyses for the SSP.  As part of this role, he led a team of 15 groups from 9 
different companies and 8 different locations across the country to complete the first  
SSP-sponsored Shuttle PRA in 2003.  He joined NASA in 2003 as the Shuttle Risk and 
Reliability Group Lead for JSC's SR&QA Directorate.  During this tenure, the Shuttle 
analysis activities more than tripled following the Columbia accident, resulting in a 
challenge to manage the increased workload while maintaining product quality.  In 2006, 
Roger was promoted to his current position as the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch Chief, 
combining the new CxP's analysis work with Shuttle's and providing oversight of the safety 
review panel chairs for both programs.  Roger has written/presented several technical 
papers on thermal-hydraulics, advanced automation, and PRA topics and has served as a 
technical paper reviewer for several national and international forums.  His professional 
interests include:  establishing a high-quality and respected risk and reliability analysis team 
for NASA; promoting the collection, maintenance, and analysis of data supporting the 
Analysis Group’s assessments; and ensuring the well-being of his teammates. 
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Bob Cross — Analysis Branch Group Lead and Constellation PRA Lead 
Bob has a B.S. and M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Florida.  He joined 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1986, performing thermal-hydraulic and nuclear core 
design analyses in the Nuclear Fuels group.  In 1989, he joined HL&P in a similar position 
before transferring to the PRA group.  In the PRA group, he served as the Principal 
Investigator for the STP Individual Plant PRA Examination, where he was responsible for 
system analysis and overall model quantification.  At HL&P, Bob also developed the risk 
model plant operators and maintenance personnel used for realtime risk assessments as 
well as participated on the plant emergency response team. 
In 1996, Bob entered the aerospace industry and began working for SAIC as a Senior PRA 
Analyst on the JSC SR&QA contract.  Later he became a Project Manager at SAIC, 
developing new business for oil and gas industry risk assessments.  As part of this role, he 
led teams that performed numerous risk assessments related to offshore drilling.  In 2001, 
Bob joined American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Consulting as a Senior Consultant.  
During this tenure, he held the lead position responsible for integrating risk-informed 
decision-making in ABS’ shipping industry, which involved developing risk-informed 
construction guides for ship owners, training ABS personnel, and developing quantitative 
risk models. 
In 2003, Bob returned to the aerospace industry as a Senior PRA Analyst in JSC's SR&QA 
Directorate.  He currently serves as the Group Lead and Constellation PRA Lead in the 
JSC S&MA Analysis Branch.  His current responsibilities include overseeing and directing 
the analysis activities of the Analysis Group and specifically directing/interfacing with the 
CxP on all LOC and LOM discussions.  Bob has also written/presented several technical 
papers on risk and reliability topics for several national and international forums. 
Mark Bigler — EVA and Abort 
Mark Bigler has a B.S. in Electrical Engineering with a minor in Economics from New 
Mexico State University and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from Texas A&M.  Mark 
began his career serving four yeas as an officer in the Nuclear Navy.  While in the Navy, 
he served aboard the USS California as a Mechanical Division Officer and later as an 
Electrical Division Officer.  Mark also served as an Engineering Watch Officer over 
nuclear propulsion plants in the Navy.  After completing his naval tour, Mark joined the 
reliability engineering group at the STP Nuclear Plant for three years.  In this position, 
Mark was introduced to PRA with his work on the Maintenance Rule, which was a new 
regulation developed to ensure that maintenance programs at nuclear power plants were 
more risk-informed.  Mark later entered the aerospace industry as a reliability analyst for 
Lockheed Martin in the system safety group, where he performed Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis and hazard analysis on several projects including:  the Space Station 
Airlock Test Article; the Umbilical Interface Assembly for the Quest airlock; A Chamber B 
human rated test; and the EVA helmet lights, batteries, and associated charger.  After 
leaving Lockheed Martin, Mark worked for SAIC almost 10 years.  During that time, he 
was responsible for several Shuttle system PRAs, including OMS/RCS, ATCS, 
Environmental Control and Life Support System, and Landing Deceleration.  Mark also 
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worked on an initial EVA PRA proof of concept study to show the benefits of an EVA 
PRA to both the Shuttle and ISS Programs.  Mark also provided valuable input to the 
Entry Public Risk Assessment using the Shuttle PRA results.  In his last two years at SAIC, 
Mark served as PRA Analyst Technical Lead.  In that role, Mark provided guidance to the 
support services contractor PRA group; oversaw a PRA team that updated the Shuttle 
PRA; reviewed PRA group analyses; started developing CxP and Orion PRA models for 
both Lunar Sortie and ISS missions; mentored new employees; developed plans, schedules, 
and budgets; provided inputs for performance appraisals; and relayed project statuses to 
management and customers.  Mark joined the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch in November 
2007.  He is currently responsible for risk analyses related to abort, range safety, and EVA.  
He also provides support to both Constellation Program level and Orion Project level 
PRA analyses. 
Teri Hamlin — Shuttle PRA Lead 
Teri has a B.S. in Nuclear/Mechanical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute.  
Teri worked at Northeast Utilities for eight years performing PRA activities for their three 
Millstone Nuclear Power Plants.  In 2002, Teri entered the aerospace industry as a PRA 
analyst for SAIC.  At SAIC, she served as the lead for the Shuttle Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA), which represents the most comprehensive Shuttle HRA to date.  Teri was 
also responsible for other Shuttle system PRAs at SAIC and also provided backup 
integration expertise.  In 2006, Teri joined the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch as the Shuttle 
PRA Lead.  She is currently responsible for overseeing all Shuttle PRA activities as well as 
HRA activities for both the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. 
Dr. Richard Heydorn — Cx R&M and Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel 
(COPV) 
Richard has a Bachelor of Electrical Engineering (B.E.E.) and a Master of Arts (M.A.) in 
Mathematics from the University of Akron.  He also has a Doctorate in Statistics from 
Ohio State University.  After working at Goodyear Aerospace, North American Rockwell, 
and the Battelle Memorial Institute; he joined the Earth Resources Division at JSC to 
develop pattern recognition methods for estimating wheat production from Landsat 
satellite data.  Following the Challenger accident, he joined the Reliability Division of the 
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Control Office working on statistical reliability and general 
statistical problems.  He has migrated through numerous changes in the safety and 
reliability organizational structure at JSC and has continuously made significant 
contributions to statistical and reliability issues throughout his NASA career.  Richard’s 
most current accomplishments include:  estimating the reliability of COPVs for the SSP, 
developing statistical experiment designs for the COPV reliability model in the CxP, and 
applying generalized regression methods to estimate pistol grip tool torque prediction 
intervals for evaluating structure assembly tolerance on the ISS.  Richard has also taught 
statistics as an adjunct at the University of Houston—Clear Lake since 1991 and is an 
adjunct at Rice University. 
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Bruce Reistle — Data Lead 
Bruce has a B.S. and M.S. in Mathematics from Virginia Tech and a Master of Operations 
Research from North Carolina State.  After teaching secondary math for two years, Bruce 
worked for Intel as a facility design analyst.  Bruce later joined SAIC as a reliability analyst.  
In Bruce’s seven years with SAIC, he predominantly worked as a reliability analyst for 
Shuttle projects.  He served as data analyst and was the primary author of six reliability 
reports and co-authored several others.  In 2007, Bruce joined the JSC S&MA Analysis 
Branch as the Data Lead.  In this role, he is responsible for PRA data including collection, 
analysis, and structure.  Bruce also develops ad-hoc Monte Carlo models such as the 
Ascent Debris Assessment Model, which assesses the probability of having a critical 
damage to the Orbiter’s lower surface tiles; and the LLCO model, which determines the 
probability of prematurely depleting the liquid hydrogen supply and hence requiring use of 
the ECO sensors. 
Henk Roelant — Orion R&M and Software Reliability 
Henk has a B.S. and a Master of Engineering (M.E.) in Electrical Engineering from Old 
Dominion University.  He began his civil servant career with the Department of Defense 
as the reliability engineer for the Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar Program under the 
In-Service Engineering Agent.  Henk joined NASA in 1990 at LaRC as a reliability 
engineer.  From 1990 to 2001 at LaRC, he served as the Lead Reliability Engineer for the 
Office of Mission Assurance and was responsible for assessing the mathematical reliability 
of aeronautical projects/programs and spaceflight products that fell under the auspices of 
NASA LaRC as well as developing assurance methodologies, processes, and related tools 
as they relate to reliability.  A major highlight in Henk’s tenure with LaRC was working on 
the Galileo/Aerospace System Safety Assessment Program software fault tree analysis tool, 
which was initially completed in 2001.  This tool was developed to provide a large system-
level analysis of an entire transport aircraft where subsystem failure independence did not 
have to be assumed.  In 2001, Henk transferred to JSC as a reliability engineer, working on 
Shuttle PRA and R&M projects.  He is currently working with a team of analysts to 
quantify software risk for the CxP and provides analytical support to the Orion Project 
Office. 
Michael Stewart — Senior PRA Analyst 
Mike Stewart has a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from Iowa State University and an M.S. 
in Mechanical Engineering from Wichita State University.  He received a Master’s 
equivalent degree in Nuclear Engineering from the U.S. Navy in the Nuclear Power School 
and Prototype Training Program for Officers.  He also holds a Professional Engineering 
License.  Mike’s professional experience includes:  serving as an Officer on a U.S. Navy 
Nuclear Submarine, working at several commercial nuclear power plants as a manager and 
individual contributor, working at national laboratories as a project and program manager, 
working as a project manager at the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, and providing 
peer review for multiple PRAs.  Throughout his career, Mike has been involved in 
operations, design, maintenance, and analysis. 
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Mike has extensive PRA experience and has made significant contributions to current PRA 
practices and procedures.  While employed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 
he participated in the early reviews of Wash-1400, which was recognized as the first 
modern full scope PRA.  Mike served as an Analysis Manager at several nuclear power 
plant utilities that included Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFDs), structural analysis, and 
PRA.  He was involved in the early development of RELAP and RETRAN (two CFD 
codes).  Mike was also instrumental in getting the commercial nuclear industry to adopt a 
peer review process.  He prepared the documentation for a nuclear power plant PRA, 
which was used as a pilot to prepare the peer review standard that is currently used by the 
commercial nuclear industry.  In addition, both the Electrical Power Research Institute and 
American Society for Mechanical Engineers have developed PRA standards that were 
originally adapted from Mike’s documentation for the aforementioned nuclear power plant 
PRA.  The power plant for which Mike prepared the PRA documentation still holds the 
highest score for peer review of any plant.  An additional plant that employed Mike also 
has one of the highest scores for their PRA as a result of documentation changes that 
Mike oversaw.  Mike has also authored several nuclear regulatory guidelines (NUREGs) 
for the NRC.  He was an early contributor to HRA and worked on the nuclear industry-
supported Oconee PRA.  As a consultant, Mike worked in the petrochemical, 
transportation, and nuclear industries performing safety analysis and PRA. 
Mike transitioned into the aerospace industry 10 years ago as the Lead PRA Engineer for 
the JSC SR&QA prime contractor, SAIC.  In this position, he used his experience and 
knowledge from documenting PRA as well as establishing peer review to manage the 
production of the current Shuttle PRA, which is recognized as the best and most complete 
documented PRA in NASA.  Mike later became a civil servant and served as the Lead 
NASA ISS PRA Analyst.  In this position, he re-organized and re-initiated a significant 
upgrade to the ISS PRA.  He was also instrumental in getting the NASA ISS database 
updated using Bayesian methods, which significantly increased the accuracy of the 
database predictions.  Over the course of his career, Mike has mentored several engineers 
in the art of PRA and has developed several successful teams that have completed PRAs.  
Mike is presently conducting reviews for the Orion PRA and has developed a number of 
the Orion training courses for performing PRA.  He reviews the Orion PRA and advises 
the contractor and NASA management of problems and other items associated with the 
PRA.  He also acts as the interface between Orion Project S&MA and the CxP. 
Mark Valentine — Shuttle R&M and Ascent Debris 
Mark has a Bachelor of Architectural Engineering (B.A.E.) from Penn State University and 
an M.S. in Industrial Engineering from the University of Houston.  After working in 
consulting and industry, Mark began working at JSC in 1985.  Mark began his NASA 
career in the Facility Design Division.  Since then, he has worked in the Advanced 
Programs Office, the System Architecture and Integration Office, and most recently within 
the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch.  His current responsibilities include Shuttle and 
Constellation Program R&M. 
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Scott Winter — Lunar Lander 
Scott has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Missouri – Rolla.  Scott 
joined JSC in 1981 as a Quality Engineer, supporting the SSP.  In that position, he worked 
on a variety of activities from Extravehicular Mobility Unit and Manned Maneuvering Unit 
design certification to the post-STS 51L Main Propulsion System design assessment. 
During his NASA career, Scott also served as Chief of the Shuttle Systems Section in the 
Quality Assurance Division and later became Chief of the ISS Systems Section in the 
SR&QA Directorate.  While working for ISS, he was assigned as the Chief NASA 
Negotiator for the Russian Segment R&M requirement. 
In recent years, Scott has been performing research into variable specific impulse 
magnetoplasma rockets—including thermal performance, power balance, and 
reliability/service life.  He now supports the CxP’s Lunar Lander Project Office and Lunar 
Surface Systems Office in overseeing risk/reliability analyses. 
JSC S&MA Support Services Contractors 
Through the S&MA Support Services Contract (SSC), the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch uses 
the technical expertise of about 30 engineers and scientists.  The team has the education 
and experience to apply cutting edge mathematics and reliability techniques for S&MA 
analyses.  These techniques include text data mining, Weibull analysis, physics of failure, 
logistics regression, trend analysis, common cause failure analysis, HRA, and others. 
The S&MA SSC brings together engineers and scientists from the leading companies in the 
safety and reliability industry, including SAIC and SoHaR.  SAIC is one of the largest 
science and technology companies in the U.S.  SAIC is the prime contractor and provides 
management oversight for the JSC S&MA SSC.  SAIC also provides most of the PRA 
contractor staff for the Analysis Group, which are highly trained safety, reliability, and 
quality PRA analysts and engineers.  SoHaR is a leader in the software and hardware 
reliability industry.  SoHaR provides most of the reliability analysts for the Analysis 
Group.  SoHaR also brings RAM-Commander™, a cutting-edge reliability and 
maintainability prediction tool, to the Analysis Group as well as the expertise in using the 
software to maximize the tool’s capabilities.  Together, this contracting team delivers 
mission-critical products and services to the JSC S&MA Analysis Branch for the Analysis 
Group’s commitment and contribution to safety and success in all of NASA’s spaceflight 
operations. 
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ACRONYMS 
ABS American Bureau of Shipping 
Altair Lunar Lander 
APM Ascent Performance Margin 
APU Auxiliary Power Unit 
ATCS Active Thermal Control System 
B.S. Bachelor of Science 
CAR Corrective Action Report 
CARD Constellation Architecture Requirements Document 
CFDs Computational Fluid Dynamics 
COPV Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel 
CSCS Contingency Shuttle Crew Support 
CSERP Constellation Safety and Engineering Review Panel 
CxP Constellation Program 
ECO Engine Cutoff 
EPC Emittance Primer Coating 
ESD Event Sequence Diagram 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FB Fuel Bias 
FD 2 Flight Day 2 
FRP Flight Performance Reserve 
FSW Flight Software 
GMO Ground and Mission Operations 
GPC General Purpose Computer 
HL&P Houston Lighting & Power 
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit 
HRA Human Reliability Analysis 
HST Hubble Space Telescope 
IFA In-Flight Anomaly 
ISL Information Systems Lab 
ISS International Space Station 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LCRSP Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
LDAC Lunar Lander Design Analysis Cycle 
LLCO Low Level Cutoff 
LOC Loss of Crew 
LOCV Loss of Crew and Vehicle 
LOM Loss of Mission 
LON Launch on Need 
MECO Main Engine Cutoff 
MER Mission Evaluation Room 
MMOD Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
MMT Mission Management Team 
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MOD Mission Operations Directorate 
MPS Main Propulsion System 
M.S. Master of Science 
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NECS NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NOAX Non-Oxide Adhesive Experimental 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NUREGs Nuclear Regulation Guidelines 
OFTP Orbit Flight Techniques Panel 
OGS Oxygen Generation System 
OI Orbital Increment 
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System 
OMS/RCS Orbital Maneuvering System/Reaction Control System 
OSMA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
PA-1 Pad Abort 1 
PBIS Power Bus Isolation Supply 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
PRACA Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
PRAWG Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working Group 
PRCB Program Requirements Control Board 
PSB Point Sensor Box 
PWR Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne 
R&M Reliability and Maintainability 
RAM Reliability Availability Maintainability 
RCC Reinforced Carbon Carbon 
RID Review Item Discrepancy 
S&MA Safety and Mission Assurance 
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 
SE&I Systems Engineering and Integration 
SIG Systems Integration Group 
SM Service Module 
SPIT Safety Problem Investigation Team 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
SR&QA Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
SSC Support Services Contract 
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 
SSP Space Shuttle Program 
STP South Texas Project 
STS Space Transportation System 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
T-RAD Tile Repair Ablator Dispenser 
TVC Thrust Vector Control 
USA United Space Alliance 
WSMR White Sands Missile Range 
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